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Abstract
Climate science initially aspired to improve understanding of what the
future would bring, and thereby produce appropriate public policies and
e¤ective international climate agreements. If that hope is dashed, as now
seems probable, e¤ective policies for adapting to climate change become
critical. Climate science assumes new responsibilities by helping to fos-
ter more appropriate adaptation measures, which might include shifting
modes or locales of production. This theoretical article focuses on two
broader tools: consumption smoothing in response to the risk of future
losses, and physical adaptation measures to reduce potential damages. It
shows that informative signals on the e¤ects of climate change facilitate
better decisions on the use of each tool, thereby increasing social welfare.
1 Introduction
Climate science aspired to improve understanding of the future, and thereby promote
appropriate public policies and e¤ective international climate agreements. With that
hope dashed, what contribution can climate science make to policy? This theoretical
article shows that receiving clearer signals about the likelihood of future states of
a warmer world would provide substantial utility, even in the absence of binding
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global agreements, or e¤ective national policies on mitigation. Signals provide the
basis upon which the adaptation activities of sovereign nations, regions, rms and
even individuals are made so that their expected welfare can be increased.
Informative signals provide benet in enabling more informed saving and con-
sumption smoothing decisions, but they are particularly valuable when physical adap-
tation measures, such as ood defenses or choice of location, are also available. So,
although an important impetus for climate research was to inform and inuence
high-level negotiations on collective action, knowing more about the likelihood of
future outcomes is also a valuable input both for individual governments, and for
agents operating at lower, more decentralised organisational levels. These are the
parties who will ultimately make adaptation decisions, irrespective of the success of
international agreements.
This article focuses on adaptation because it is an inevitable part of the response
to climate change [1]. The best predictions so far suggest that, whatever is agreed
at the 21st Conference of Parties in Paris in December this year (COP21), there is
by now su¢ cient inertia in the climate system to lock-in temperature increases of
between 0.3 and 0.7 degrees Celsius (C) for the period 20162035 relative to 1986
2005 [2, 3]. For the period 20802100 temperature change is expected to exceed
1.5C for all but the most stringent Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP)
contained in the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC (AR5). It is thus unlikely
that we will meet the scientic view that the increase in global temperature should
be below 2 degrees Celsiuscompared to the pre-industrial average ([4], article 1) that
was agreed in the Copenhagen Accord arising out of the COP15. Indeed RCP2.6,
the most stringent of the RCPs, shows that in order for the 2C limit not to be
exceeded, emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases will have to turn negative
towards the end of the 21st century.
Adaptation has shifted from a subject lurking in the shadows, as it did in the
early years following the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), to one granted more or less equal status in a recent meeting of the
Conference of Parties [5]. Some major players in the past felt that discussion of
adaptation would undermine e¤orts to agree on mitigation targets. Al Gore made
this point forcefully when he said that focusing on adaptation represented a kind
of laziness, an arrogant faith in our ability to react in time to save our skins. The
UNFCCC devoted little time to adaptation, and dened it narrowly as a simple
reactive behaviour to future climate change [5].
The prime reason why adaptation has now become a prime policy concern is
that agreement on stringent emissions reductions has not been achieved, and will
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require a miracleat the COP21 according to some.1 It has been argued for some
time that the nature of climate change as a spatial and intergenerational problem,
together with the absence of an enforcement mechanism within the Kyoto Proto-
col and successive agreements, more or less precludes agreement on collective action
[6, 7, 8, 9]. Beyond the straightforward free-rider problems, most countries recog-
nise that a successful international response to climate change mitigation requires
the participation of the two major contributors to greenhouse gases (GHGs), China
and the US. So far the US has shied away from signing the Kyoto protocol, while
China remains a Non-Annex I country with no obligations under the principal of
shared but di¤erentiated responsibilities. It has also been shown theoretically and
in behavioural experiments that uncertainty surrounding climate change damages
discourages agreement, particularly when this uncertainty concerns the location of
catastrophic thresholds such as the 2C limit of the Copenhagen Accord [10].
As a counter-argument we might look to the recent Sino-US pledges on emis-
sions reductions, where the Obama administration pledged a 2628% reduction in
GHG emissions by 2025, while President Xi simultaneously made a general pledge
to commence emissions reduction by 2030. However, the proposed reductions are
far from su¢ cient to contain signicant additional accumulations of GHGs. More-
over enforcement is lacking; there are no clear plans of implementation on either
side, and the reliance of the US pledge on executive authority means it may well
be reversed under a Republican administration.2 The di¤erences between these re-
spective pledges reects the inherent asymmetry of the problem more generally. A
global agreement must resolve the fact that negotiating countries are at very dif-
ferent stages of development, and that the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) will
either require compensation for stringent emissions reductions, or will only commit
to mitigation once development has taken place [11]. Optimistically positing sig-
nicant Sino-US progress beyond their recent pledges, world energy demand is still
predicted to increase as incomes, not to mention populations, in LDCs increase in
the future [12, 13]. For all of these reasons, adaptation is now an unavoidable fea-
ture of the response to climate change, particularly in LDCs. This view is reected
in the high-level institutions of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) with the formation at the COP16 in Cancun of the Cancun Adaptation
Framework. Similarly, both AR4 and AR5 [3, 2] have detailed chapters devoted en-
1The president of France, Francois Hollande, has been quoted to this e¤ect.
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/may/20/francois-hollande-calls-for-miracle-
climate-agreement-at-paris-talks
2See http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/us/obama-to-o¤er-major-blueprint-on-climate-
change.html?
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tirely to adaptation. Even the US president has recently highlighted the need for
climate preparedness [14].
Of course, as with mitigation, adaptation decisions must be taken despite con-
siderable uncertainty about the impact of climate change in the future. As one
looks into the distant future, as is necessary for such problems that stretch across
generations, every aspect of the problem becomes increasingly fuzzy. Probability dis-
tributions attached to events widen; estimates of key variables become less precise;
we are even uncertain about the probabilities to attach to di¤erent outcomes in the
deep future. Responses to climate change therefore must be taken in an environment
of uncertainty and ambiguity rather than risk, and even possibly ignorance, where
some important possible states of the world cannot be identied [15].
There are three chief sources of uncertainty in our understanding of future climate
change: i) the level of future emissions; ii) the impact of emissions on temperatures;
and, iii) the damages that arise [16]. Take for instance climate sensitivity, which
measures the increase in temperature from a doubling of CO2. Estimates of this
parameter in the AR5 come from many and various sources. Climate models are
one such source, and disagreement among them is plain to see in Figure 1. Yet,
with the passing of time scientic research, and in particular the arrival of additional
data, will improve our understanding of such relationships. We can expect the un-
certainty surrounding some of these factors to narrow, both in the sense of obtaining
more precise predictions or obtaining closer agreement among climate models, not
to mention experts, and on the extent of uncertainty. There are good reasons why
we may not see a narrowing of the distributions per se, see for instance [17], but
we may learn more about the distribution itself, including the likelihood of catas-
trophic outcomes. We may also expect clearer information from improvements in
the estimation of climate damages. Ultimately though, the relevant information to
improve adaptation decisions would be provided at a local level. Here too better
information could eventually narrow the disagreement among regional models that
currently exists. Adaptation in many sectors can then be placed on a rmer footing
as a consequence of better, well-targeted information [12, 18, 19].
[Insert Figure 1 here]
To address our central question of how more informative signals about climate
change can improve adaptation measures, we develop a parsimonious model of an
agent who could be an individual, a rm, or a local or national government. The
agent can make a macro decision to build up savings to bu¤er potential future
losses, and/or a microphysical adaptation decision that reduces future losses from
climate change (though not limiting climate change itself). We then consider how
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the welfare of this agent is changed through improved understanding of the likely
evolution of climate change.
Our work relates to two strands of the preceding literature. In the rst, the
option value of arriving information has been analysed following a framework long
since established [20, 21, 22]. Here the essential problem is that an agent must
make a decision today knowing that a better signal will arrive in the future. In this
context the agent need not make an investment decision now, but can wait and see
how uncertainty is resolved. The problem then becomes one of optimal timing of
investment accounting for the fact that both investment (e.g., adaptation) and the
resolution of uncertainty (e.g., climate damages) are irreversible and reduce options
in the future. See in particular [22] in the context of climate change. In the second
strand, the implications for the precision of climate predictions has been analysed
for an agent who receives a short-run and a long-run prediction without knowing
that the signal (forecast) may improve in time. In this case the question concerns
the relative value of short-run and long-run predictions [16, 23].
Our approach di¤ers from these in that it evaluates a world in which information
is improving via a future signal, and the agent makes consumption and savings
decisions as soon as this signal is received. Evaluated in advance, we capture the
welfare value of better scientic information on saving and adaptation decisions, but
strip out issues of option value and irreversibility.
As intuition would suggest, we formally prove that a risk averse agent bene-
ts from better scientic information. In the macro adaptation case, this reduces
uncertainty in the future and allows the agent to better smooth consumption over
time. This e¤ect is monotonic in the strength of the signal. The value of the signal
is enhanced when micro adaptation strategies are also available. Then adaptation
measures can be better tailored to di¤erent states of the world. However, the devil
is in the details. Our analysis then examines how properties of the consumption
utility function a¤ect levels of savings and physical adaptation. We present both
analytic results and numerical calculations. The latter illustrate, for example, the
non-monotonic way in which the levels of micro and macro adaptations respond as
signals improve.
2 Scientic Uncertainty in Climate Change
In this section we discuss the pervasive uncertainties associated with climate change.
This is done with a view to understanding where continued scientic research may
be able to provide better signals about the future of climate change. Taken together,
[24] and [16] provide a helpful structure, which we now summarise.
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Predicting the future is a di¢ cult task at the best of times, but the sheer com-
plexity and time horizon associated with climate change amplies these di¢ culties.
Our knowledge about the future of climate change comes from two main sources: i)
scientic understanding, including physical laws; and, ii) the empirical predictions
of climate models. While the laws are matters of fact, the movement from laws
to predictions leads to an uncertain picture of the future as the models attempt to
reproduce extremely complex systems using di¤erent assumptions and calibrations.
There is a distinction to be drawn between predictions or forecasts and projections
in this context. The former attempts to account for the correct phase of natural
internal climate variations (such as the El Niño Southern Oscillation), whereas the
latter does not. A forecast must be initialised to be in phase with the observed
cycles, and becomes a projection as it moves out of phase. A projection is still a
valid representation of the statistical properties of the climate system, yet without
an explicit conditioning on the phase of the natural variability. Alternatively, the
IPCC refers to the most likely projection as a forecast [2]. Whether predicting or
projecting the future climate, models are subject to their own errors and potential
omissions [25].
In the context of adaptation, the uncertain process of technological change means
that the future costs of adaptation are also a source of uncertainty about the future,
just as abatement costs are uncertain when thinking about mitigation. More speci-
cally, with regard to climate change and damages, we are much more uncertain about
predictions with longer lead times or greater spatial denition. The distant future,
and country or regional level predictions are fuzzierthan short-term or global pre-
dictions [24].
When thinking about adaptation to climate change, decisions will depend upon
the uncertainty surrounding future exposure to climate damages. Future emissions
paths are undoubtedly di¢ cult to predict, but calibrating the damage function is
one of the key weaknesses of Integrated Assessment Models and a source of great
uncertainty [26, 27]. At present damage functions are constructed on the basis of
ad hoc assumptions based on loose extrapolations and intuition[28]. Small changes
in parameters lead to large changes in estimated damages and associated policy
recommendations, yet the AR5 cites only a dozen or so sources for its estimates of
the damage function; many come from the same experts. It is widely regarded as
an area ripe for improvements in understanding and more rened information on
uncertainty [2].
Together with predicted emissions paths and damage functions, climate sensitiv-
ity is one of the key pieces of the climate-change puzzle. In contrast to the damage
function, this has received a great deal of scientic research. Despite this, its value
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remains very uncertain [29, 16]. Figure 1 shows the probability density functions for
this parameter value for a large number of prominent climate models. The models
clearly disagree on the likelihoods to attach to di¤erent values of climate sensitivity;
there is uncertainty rather than simply risk.
For decision making purposes, these estimates are typically aggregated into a
single density function, either by Bayesian methods as used in AR5 or by using
expert assessment. Even then the aggregated climate sensitivity remains a source
of great uncertainty. Using such methods the likely rangeof climate sensitivity,
meaning the central 66% of the distribution of estimates, is currently 1.54.5C.
This range has remained somewhat steadfast since the First Assessment Report of
the IPCC (AR1), with only a brief narrowing of the range at the time of the Fourth
Assessment Report in 2007 to 24.5C: the physical reasons for the robustness of the
distribution of climate sensitivity have been well documented [17]. As well as the
likely range, the summary distribution of climate sensitivity reported in AR5 provides
information about the likelihood of extreme, high temperature states of the world.
For instance, the likelihood of a temperature rise in excess of 6C is approximately
10% [29]. Some have argued that climate policy ought to be organised around this
information rather than the central ranges, since increases in temperature of this
magnitude would represent truly catastrophic outcomes, which make up the vast
majority of expected losses [30].
Climate sensitivity and climate damages are good examples of the information
we can expect from research on climate change. They guide the analysis of climate
scenarios and provide the essential information upon which climate negotiations and
adaptation decisions are made. Yet there are several areas where improvements in
this kind of scientic information are likely. Experts tend to agree that, as time
passes, temperatures and CO2 emissions will move further into uncharted territory,
and scientists will learn more about the complex climatic relationships. The var-
ious distributions of climate sensitivity will most likely become more similar, and
disagreement among models and experts will most likely diminish. New models and
techniques will also arrive. In recent years, the reported hiatus in observed global
warming has encouraged greater focus to be placed on the ocean-atmosphere linkages
in climate models, while e¤orts have been made to improve data collection or the
interpretation of historical data. Such research endeavours to better inform climate
projections in the future [31, 32, 33]. Advances like these improve the accuracy,
not to mention the credibility, of climate models and their projections. Similar ar-
guments can be made for the damage function and knowledge of how humans will
respond to these changes, for example through migrations, wars, and innovation.
Yet learning is also likely in relation to more esoteric issues, such as how best to
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aggregate models and expert opinions [25, 34]. For instance, expert opinions provide
a useful source of information for estimating climate sensitivity since their subjective
probabilities are calculated using their experience with a variety of climate models
and their expert views of their advantages and shortcomings. However, experimental
evidence indicates that experts at times violate the axioms of rationality that moti-
vate the use of subjective probabilities in the rst place [34]. Probabilities derived
this way may paint a more optimistic or pessimistic picture of the uncertainties that
we face, compared to more appropriate aggregation methods [34, 24]. Even without
these behavioural/rationality issues, others argue that simply combining the results
from climate models to form a single distribution of climate sensitivity only cap-
tures a fraction of the uncertainty that we face, and ignores the deeper uncertainties
contained in individual climate models. It could well be that other representations
of uncertainty might be more appropriate [25, 35], or alternative decision-making
frameworks should be used to account explicitly for the inherent ambiguity of cli-
mate sensitivity [24, 23].
Furthermore, making predictions at higher levels of geographical denition rep-
resents another source of profound uncertainty. Country level predictions of the
evolution of climate change are notoriously imprecise since they depend on local en-
vironmental factors such as topography. This is particularly true for precipitation,
since the science of cloud formation is subject to stochastic processes which are less
well-understood. Consider, for example, the predictions for temperature and precip-
itation in China for the decades up to 2050 and 2100 coming from three prominent
climate models: the Hadley Centre Coupled Model (HCMIII), the Parallel Climate
Model (PCM2), and the Community Climate Model (CCM2) [18].3 While each
predicts more or less the same temperature rise on average, some predict greater
precipitation in the future, while others predict signicantly less [18]. Improving the
accuracy and precision of spatially dened predictions is one area where additional
research could bear fruit [23, 16].
There are several areas where scientic research will be able to either improve
predictions or at least provide more informative signals about the level of uncertainty
we are facing. Some scientists believe that a tripling of current funding levels would
reduce uncertainty in transient climate response, an element of climate sensitivity,
by approximately one third [16, 36]. Others argue that, irrespective of scientic
advances, it is the actual delivery of existing information to those who need it that
provides the informative signal. Developments of this kind have similar e¤ects upon
decision-makers who were previously in the dark[37]. There is no doubt that there
3http://www.cgd.ucar.edu/pcm/; http://www.meto¢ ce.gov.uk/research/modelling-
systems/unied-model/climate-models/hadcm3; http://www.cgd.ucar.edu/cms/ccm3/
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are frequent calls for such tailored information to improve adaptation decisions and
to avoid maladaptation[14, 19].
Simple practical examples exist of where a clearer picture of the uncertainty fac-
ing potential agents assisted in their adaptation/risk management decisions. In the
Netherlands maps have been produced that clarify the probability of ooding in
di¤erent locales [38]. Elsewhere, better predictions of the danger zones for natural
disasters have also been provided [39]. There is a growing demand for such informa-
tion from international and governmental organisations, commercial quarters, and
local planners alike [23]. The provision of such information is also taken seriously by
major global organisations. For example, provision of this kind of information is a
major component of the World Meteorological Organisations Global Framework for
Climate Services [16]. In Southern Africa, informative climate signals about the El
Niño Southern Oscillation have assisted agricultural decisions since 1997 [37].
Of course, we must remain mindful that uncertainty surrounding some aspects
of climate analysis is likely to be irreducible. The processes of cloud formation, the
path of future emissions, and many other socio-economic processes, are extremely
di¢ cult to narrow down. Such quantities may well dominate uncertainty in the
long-run [16, 23]. It is striking to note that the distribution of climate sensitivity
has not narrowed signicantly since the early estimates in the 1970s [30]. Yet, more
informative signals about the likelihoods of di¤erent future states of the world are
possible in some of the areas described above, and are widely seen as an important
input to adaptation decisions in many di¤erent circumstances [14, 36, 16].
Improvement in the information about the future can in principle come from any
or all of the sources of uncertainty discussed above. In our formal analysis the signal
concerning the probability of the severe (high temperature, high damage) state stems
from better information on future climate or emissions, rather than damages. Before
going into the details, we discuss some specics of adaptation.
3 Adaptation as a response to climate change
3.1 Increased emphasis on adaptation
Three main factors have led to the increased emphasis on adaptation. First, inertia
in the climate system means that the full e¤ect of historical emissions is yet to be
felt. To quote the Stern Review, there are some unavoidable impacts of climate
change to which the world is already committed[40]. Second, equity concerns have
dictated a shift in focus towards the impact on developing countries, which are the
most vulnerable to climate change due to their reliance on climate sensitive sectors
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such as agriculture, forestry and sheries [41]. Third, a strong sense developed that
the focus on mitigation to reduce climate risks in the future ignored the very real
prospect of current climate and non-climate related development issues, such as the
control of malaria. The objectives of adaptation strategies often overlap with those
of development more generally [5].
Precisely these arguments have elevated adaptation to more or less equal status
with mitigation in high-level negotiations and associated institutions. The outcome
of the COP16 in Cancun and agreement on the Cancun Adaptation Framework
(CAF) testify to this.4 The salient aspects of the CAF and associated Adaptation
Committee for the purposes of this article concern their role in the provision of in-
formation and the promotion of scientic research on climate change. For instance,
the Cancun Agreement in Article I, Section 14(h) and (i) states that a key role of the
CAF is: Strengthening data, information and knowledge systems; and, improving
climate-related research and systematic observation for climate data collection .... in
order to provide decision makers at the national and regional levels with improved
climate-related data and information. Furthermore, the Adaptation Committees
objectives include Sharing of relevant information, knowledge, experience and good
practices; and, providing information and recommendations, drawing on adaptation
good practices, for consideration by the COP when providing guidance .... on adap-
tation actions. In short, adaptation is now a prime concern for high-level climate
institutions, and the provision of scientic information to potential adapters is now
an important part of the adaptation framework. Nationally, National Adaptation
Plans are also being developed and implemented in line with the Cancun Agree-
ment. There are even parallels in the U.S., albeit apart from these international
processes, with the need for climate preparedness and information provision being
underscored in President Obamas recent climate policy announcements [14].
3.2 Categories of adaptation
Adaptation can be reactive or anticipatory [44, 1]. Reactive activities are immedi-
ate responses to events caused by climate change, for example, stacking sandbags
to prevent ood damage [38]. Anticipatory adaptation is pro-active [45], as would
be building dikes against the sea, or designing houses to better withstand storms.
Adaptation decisions can be planned, as are migration policies from threatened areas
set by the government of Bangladesh, or public health measures taken in the tropics.
4The Delhi Declaration of 2002 which called for a greater focus on the plight of developing
countries in international negotiations, leading to the Bali Action Plan of 2007, and arguments in
academia have all assisted in the integration of adaptation into the UNFCCC [5, 42, 43].
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Alternatively, they can be autonomous and decentralized, as when farmers switch
crops or businesses air condition factories [45, 46, 47]. Autonomous decisions are
taken by individual actors. Planned decisions are generally undertaken by govern-
ments; international agreements may be required to deal with border-crossing issues,
such as river basins, as well as to coordinate other issues such as substitute and
complementary adaptations [44].
Our primary focus is on anticipatory adaptation, namely measures undertaken
either by saving, or by investing in physical adaptation. Some adaptation measures,
such as creating or restoring wetlands and moving citizens inland, reduce risk expo-
sure. Others, such as moving electrical equipment out of basements, reduce damage
should risks arrive. Having individuals save funds for when ood losses are incurred
represent still a third, insurance-style, approach to adaptation. Our formal analysis
allows for the possibility that physical adaptation measures are constrained, and that
households must rely on consumption-savings decisions to adapt to future climate
change.
4 The Framework
In this section we describe the framework with which we value the arrival of an
informative signal on future climate change for a decision maker deciding on how
to adapt to future states of the world. We use a stripped down two-period model,
which reduces the problem to the essential features we wish to explore. The model
reects the aforementioned aspects of adaptation decisions that the agent may adapt
by either saving money or investing in damage reduction. The agent we consider can
just as well be thought of as a sovereign nation planning adaptation unilaterally:
e.g., Bangladesh, the Netherlands, or the UK; or an individual household making
adaptation decisions: crop choice, ood defenses, or saving; or anything in between.
The agent should be thought of as being at the appropriate organizational level
for the decisions at hand, and choosing wisely how much adaptation to undertake.
Decisions are made against a backdrop of exogenous mitigation policies and available
information about the damage that climate change will cause.
4.1 The impact of adaptation: measurement issues
Our analysis considers adaptation measures at an aggregated level. Thus, for exam-
ple, we do not assess whether a house is built on stilts, a wetland is restored, a factory
is put in a less convenient but better protected position or a less valuable but more
drought-resistant crop is planted. The rst part of our model focuses merely on how
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much expected welfare and period 1 consumption are raised or lowered as the signal
on the period 2 climate e¤ects, i.e., the level of the future income (or endowment),
arrives. Subsequently, in our numerical calculations, we consider period 1 physical
adaptation expenditures.
Most economic analyses of climate change focus on GDP, and treat it almost
equivalently to welfare. Though our analysis is fundamentally economic, and pays
primary attention to consumption levels, it di¤ers from these treatments in several
ways. First, it recognizes that climate change may bring about e¤ects quite apart
from GDP that a¤ect welfare. For example, a higher sea level might destroy recre-
ational beaches. Higher temperatures may impair health via pollution e¤ects or
disease vectors. If climate change is severe, a sizeable portion of the welfare losses,
whether GDP-related or not, may result from human actions in response to climate
change that adversely a¤ected other humans. For example, should climate change
promote signicant human migration, this may in turn create debilitating ethnic
tensions, wars or political disruptions. Humans would then be much worse o¤, even
if GDP were not reduced. Such non-GDP e¤ects are implicitly included in the loss
of income in future periods.
Second, GDP, as currently measured, does not consider capital destroyed or ren-
dered less valuable. Regions that experience natural disasters often experience rises
in measured GDP, given the reconstruction activity that follows. That would be true
even if all the reconstruction dollars came from the a¤ected communities. However,
that is just a mis-measurement problem. Our focus is on consumption as commonly
understood, goods and services available to provide consumptive pleasures. This
avoids accounting problems associated with attending to losses to capital stock due
to climate change or any rebuilding that is required. The adaptation measures ex-
plicitly considered here all take place in the rst period. Of course, whether climate
change is moderate or severe, there will also be responsive adaptation in the sec-
ond period, such as moving production facilities or building a sea wall. The reader
should think of the cost of those measures being added to any losses in second-period
consumption as being part of the reduction of the second-period endowment.
Thus, the basic framework we are considering chooses consumption and (subse-
quently) physical adaptation expenditures in period 1 taking into account what is
known about the period 2 endowment. Its primary goal is to determine how knowl-
edge of the likely endowment, improved via an informative signal, a¤ects expected
welfare and rst-period expenditures. There is one class of (controversial) measures
that could be undertaken to cope with climate change that is not explicitly part of
this analysis: research into geoengineering and geoengineering itself, which has been
discussed at length in a special issue of the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
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Society A [48]. Geoengineering could be thought of either as adaptation or miti-
gation. The former interpretation looks at its potential to decrease the losses from
climate change; the latter sees that, if successful, it actually reduces climate change.
Readers who wish to, however, could interpret rst-period undertakings related to
geoengineering as being self insurance expenditures.
4.2 The Theoretical Model
We consider an agent at time 1  who is anticipating decisions that he or she might
make one instant later at t = 1, the outset of period 1. The level of income for
period 1, e1, is known now, but the decision the agent must make is how much to
consume immediately, c1, and how much instead to save in a zero-interest rate bank
account.
The agent knows that in the second, and nal, period, the level of climate change
will be eithermoderate or severe and assigns unconditional probabilities of p and 1 p
respectively to those two states occurring. Income for period 2, net of adaptation
expenditures and hence available for consumption, e2, will be high, h, if climate
change is moderate, or low, l, if it is severe. See Figure 2 for the sequence of events.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
The model treats scientic knowledge as a signal that arrives in the interval
t 2 [1  ; 1] on the future state of the world, namely the outcome in period 2.
This signal, which can be good or bad, helps the agent rene the probabilities of the
moderate and severe states. A good signal increases the probability that the agent
assigns to climate change being moderate to p + "G for 0  "G  1   p, whereas a
bad signal reduces that probability to p   "B for 0  "B  p: The realisation of
climate change at time 2 is consistent with these revised probabilities. In the case
when "G = "B = 0; the signal is completely uninformative. When "G = 1   p and
"B = p; the signal is fully informative and all uncertainty is resolved at t = 1 rather
than t = 2. Other permissible values of "G and "B that do not lead respectively to
a sum of 1 or 0 represent partial signals. See Figure 3.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
The primary contribution of a signal is to improve adaptation decisions in period
1. At time 1  , the agent does not know whether the signal will be good or bad.
However, he is anticipating scientic advances that will result in probability  of the
good signal arriving and (1  ) of the bad signal arriving. The parameter values
13
; "G, and "B are all known at t = 1   . For consistency with the unconditional
probabilities, these three variables are constrained through the relationship "B =
"G= (1  ) for any p.
Since the bank interest rate is zero, the agent faces the budget constraint that
c1+c2 = e1+e2, where c2 is period 2s consumption level. Absent a fully informative
signal, e2 remains unknown at t = 1; thus uncertainty over period 2 income will
remain when the savings decision is made. c1 is chosen to maximise the agents
expected total welfare over the two periods, 	. It is assumed that this welfare can
be expressed as the sum of utility, U (c), that the individual derives from his spending
in each period.5 The agents optimisation problem can then be expressed as:
	 = max
c1
E1 [U (c1) + U (c2)] subject to c1 + c2 = e1 + e2
In line with the welfare functions that are most commonly employed in economic
theory, it is assumed that the utility function has a positive rst derivative, a negative
second derivative, and a non-negative third derivative; U 0 > 0; U 00 < 0; U 000  0:
The role of each of the rst three derivatives of the utility function has a clear
interpretation. The positive rst derivative means that more consumption is always
preferred to less, and that we are never satiated. The negative second derivative
applies if we are risk averse so that, for two gambles with the same expected payo¤, we
would always prefer the one with less risk. The strength of this preference is captured
by the Pratt-Arrow measure of absolute risk aversion, A =  U 00=U 0: A further
implication ofA > 0 is that, if we have xed total wealth,W , that we wish to consume
over two periods  c1 in period 1 and c2 = W   c1 in period 2  then welfare, 	,
is maximised if c1 = c2 = W=2. Smoothing spending patterns over time is always
preferred by a risk averse individual. The negative third derivative captures what
economists call the precautionary savings motive, which was originally described by
[49]. The stronger this motive is, as measured by absolute prudence, P =  U 000=U 00 
0 [50], the more we will save today against potentially bad outcomes given a future
risky income stream. This feature of utility functions is used to explain, amongst
other observed phenomena, why household savings go up and interest rates go down
before periods of high unemployment.
The primary variable of interest is E1  [	], the welfare that the agent currently
expects to enjoy in the future. Specically, how greatly do scientic advances in
the interval t 2 [1  ; 1] increase E1  [	] despite the fact that the signal neither
enables the agent to reduce greenhouse gas emissions nor directly protect himself
5More formally, the welfare function assumes the rate of time preference is zero and that utility
is time-separable over a single consumption good.
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from the economic consequences of climate change? A second variable of interest is
E1  [c1]. Under what circumstances will a signal lead to an increase in the expected
consumption level the next instant? Deriving answers to these two questions under
a variety of circumstances is the principle goal of our model.
To begin, we compare the case of a full signal (G = 1  p, B = p) to that of no
signal, (G = B = 0); we relax these assumptions to obtain Result 2 below and in
our numerical illustrations. In the simpler case:
Result 1. If we receive a full signal in the interval [1  ; 1], then compared
to the case of receiving no signal:
1.1 Expected welfare, E1  [	], increases.
1.2 Expected time t = 1 consumption, E1  [c1] ; increases (stays the same) if
prudence is positive (prudence is zero).
A formal proof of the result is presented in the appendix, but the intuition behind
it is straightforward. If all uncertainty is removed at time 1 then we can perfectly
smooth consumption between times 1 and 2. c1 = c2 = (e1 + h) =2 if the signal is
good or c1 = c2 = (e1 + l) =2 if the signal is bad. Smooth consumption is always
optimal in this economy because U 00 < 0. Therefore a perfect signal allows us to
make the best possible consumption decision at t = 1 and expected welfare increases.
While we do not formally model a multi-period environment in this paper, the
extension of Result 1.1 to this framework is straightforward. Since welfare is gained
through smoother consumption paths, the earlier the signal arrives the more e¤ec-
tively this can be undertaken. Therefore, in a multi-period framework, the earlier
that science can inform us about likely future climate paths, the more expected
welfare will be increased.
Result 1.2 follows from the prudence of the individual. A full signal completely
eradicates uncertainty and therefore the precautionary savings demand is eliminated
as well, raising the expected consumption level at t = 1.
Result 1.1 veries the importance of scientic advances even when such enhanced
knowledge does not lead to better (or even di¤erent) policies, hence neither does it
lead to any alterations in either temperature or future economic damages. In the
appendix we prove that this result applies also to partial signals for any value of p.
We dene a signal as getting stronger if "G increases, implying that "B also increases
since "B = "G= (1  ).
Result 2. As the strength of any signal that we receive in the interval [1  ; 1]
gets stronger:
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2.1 Expected welfare, E1  [	], increases.
2.2 Expected time t = 1 consumption, E1  [c1] ; increases (stays the same) if
prudence is positive (prudence is zero).
This demonstrates that any scientic advance increases expected welfare as it
allows the agent to make a better consumption-savings choice in period 1. This is
our central qualitative lesson.
5 Numerical examples
We now consider the quantitative magnitude of the e¤ects described in the previous
section. For our numerical examples, we dene the moderate state to be the least
damaging 70% of possible outcomes and the severe state to include the most damag-
ing 30% of outcomes. We are currently at year -5 and will, over the next ve years,
through the advances of science, receive with equal probability ( = 0:5) a good or
a bad signal about future climate change. Since  = 0:5, "G = "B = ". This will
then enable us to update our probability of the moderate state occurring to 70% + "
or 70%  " depending on which signal we receive for " 2 [0; 0:3]. " = 0 represents an
entirely uninformative signal. When " = 0:3, a good signal is fully informative but a
bad signal is not. There is no material greenhouse gas e¤ect over this initial ve year
period. Then, t1 years after the initial signal, the true state of the world is perfectly
revealed and, for t2 = 300   t1 years, we evaluate the economic damages. Given
the implications of climate change will play out over long time horizons, the welfare
e¤ect of anticipatory adaptation decisions will be felt over a similar period. For this
reason we choose a time horizon of 300 years. This is a stylised representation of
what will be a gradual process of uncertainty resolution over the long term. For the
baseline calibration we set t1 = 50 years but, in sensitivity analysis, also consider
t1 = 100 years.
Equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS) will take the value of Sm or Ss depending on
whether the state of the world is ultimately moderate (m) or severe (s). We dene
Tm;t = 2Sm
 
1  0:5t=100, which loosely follows [51], to describe how temperature
evolves should the state be moderate. This implies that, at t = 100, temperature
changes equal the ECS and as t ! 1 so Tm;t  ! 2Sm. We dene the variable
Ts;t = 2Ss
 
1  0:5t=100 analogously for the severe state.
It is assumed that over the rst time interval, t 2 [1; t1], the agent is currently
certain that the temperature will follow Tm;t. During the second period, which
ends three hundred years after the signal is received, the temperature also follows
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Tm;t if the state is moderate. However, if the state is severe, then temperatures
move smoothly away from the Tm;t path towards the Ts;t trajectory as t ! 300.
Specically, if the state is severe, then for t 2 [t1 + 1; 300], Tt = wtTm;t+ (1  wt)Ts;t
for a weighting function wt dened by:
wt =
1
1 + exp ()
;  = 0:04 (t  (t1 + 300) =2) :
This is an inverted S shaped sigmoid function that transits smoothly over the period
[t1 + 1; 300]. Notice that when t = t1 + t2=2, or half way through the second period,
the temperature is half way between Tm;t and Ts;t.
The values of S are calibrated as follows. [51] describes the probability density
function for the ECS as a displaced gamma distribution,   (; ; ) with shape pa-
rameter  = 3:8, scale parameter  = 0:92 and location parameter  =  1:13. This
gives a mean, standard deviation and skewness for the ECS of 3 degrees, 2.11 de-
grees and 9.76 respectively. We take the moderateoutcome to represent values
of the ECS that are less than 3.8 degrees. This is the value at which the cumulative
distribution function for   (; ; ) is 70%. The severe outcomes represent values of
ECS above 3.80 degrees.
To choose Sm and Ss, we take the mean of the truncated displaced gamma distri-
bution   (; ; ; u; l) where u and l are the upper and lower points of the truncation
of the distribution: see [52] for closed-form expressions for these averages. For the
moderate state, u = 3:80 and l = , while for the severe state, u =1 and l = 3:80.
This gives values of Sm = 1:89 degrees and Ss = 5:59 degrees. At t = 300, these cor-
respond to temperature rises of 3.31 degrees and 9.74 degrees respectively if t1 = 50
years, both well exceeding the 2 degree limit. We plot the evolution of temperature
for the severe and moderate states in the top graph of Figure 4.
[Insert Figure 4 around here]
The change in temperature over time is converted into damages as follows. Let
e0 = 1 describe the level of income today. In the absence of climate change dam-
age, the endowment in future years also equals 1, but the analysis could be easily
adapted to consider non-zero core growth rates. In the presence of climate change,
the endowment is a¤ected by a loss function L (Tt) which depends on the level of
temperature change at that time. We take a multiplicative loss form, et = L (Tt)
where the loss function is given by a negative quadratic exponential form used by
[53] and [51, 54]: L (Tt) = exp (  (T 2t )) for some constant . We set this param-
eter value equal to  = 0:003206. This represents a 5% loss in income should the
temperature rise by 4 degrees centigrade. [51] notes that this is consistent with
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the IPCC upper 83% estimate of potential damages for this level of temperature
change. The bottom graph in Figure 4 plots income levels under the moderate and
severe scenarios over the interval t 2 [0; 300] when t1 = 50 years. This estimate
may, though, be too low because it fails to take into account the expectation of GDP
losses, correctly measured, that human actions, such as war and ethnic strife might
bring to the world.
Total endowment in the rst period, E1=
Pt1
t=1 et and in the second period E2 =P300
t=t1+1
et. When t1 = 50 years, average annual income in the rst period is very
close to current levels (E1=t1 = 0:9985). For the second period, average annual
income is not heavily a¤ected in the moderate state (h = E2=t2 = 0:9787) but in the
severe state drops by just over 11% (l = E2=t2 = 0:8885) compared to the current
level. In sensitivity analysis below we also consider the more draconian case when
l = 0:8.
Since there are no within-period changes in information, this implies that the
optimal consumption level remains constant within time periods, but will change
from period 1 to period 2. We denote the annual consumption levels by c1 and c2;
and note that the budget constraint is t1c1 + t2c2 = E1 + E2. The optimisation
problem facing the agent is directly analogous to that described in the theoretical
section above. In period 1, endowment is allocated between a risk-free zero interest
rate bank account and consumption. The savings decision will be inuenced by the
signal received. Second period consumption is determined by the realisation of S
and the savings decision taken in period 1. If we save $b in the bank each year in
period 1, then period 2 consumption is raised by $bt1=t2 in each year.
We report results for a utility function with constant relative risk aversion:
U (ct) =
c1 t   1
1   :
As the parameter  increases, so does both the risk aversion, A = =ct; and the
prudence, P = ( + 1) =ct, of the agent. We set  = 3. Results for other values of ,
and other classes of utility function, are available on request from the authors. In
all cases that we have examined, these are consistent with the theoretical results of
the paper and the numerical example presented here.
To determine the optimal level of consumption in the rst time period, we use
a numerical solver. We report results for E1  [c1] = 0:5 (c1G + c

1B) and E1  [	]
= 0:5 (	G + 	B) where c1G and c

1B represent optimal annual period 1 consumption
levels contingent on receiving a good and bad signal respectively. 	G and 	B
represent expected welfare contingent on these respective signals. We report E1  [	]
in certainty equivalent consumption form, cCE: This variable is dened by 300U (cCE)
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= 0:5 (	G + 	B). If consumption were xed at cCE for the next 300 years, this
would give the same welfare as we expect from our possible projected consumption
paths. The benet of a signal, ", is then expressed in terms of the relative change
in certainty equivalent consumption with a signal compared to the case of no signal:
cCE (") =cCE (" = 0)   1. If this number is positive, then welfare is increased since
the agent always prefers more consumption to less.
5.1 Adaptation through consumption smoothing
Figure 5 reports results for E1  [c1] and cCE (") =cCE (" = 0)   1 as the strength
of the signal changes when t1 = 50 years. These results are consistent with the
theoretical results described above. Expected welfare is improved by a stronger
signal as it allows the agent to better smooth consumption between periods. The
expected level of period 1 consumption also uniformly increases with the strength of
the signal.
[Insert Figure 5 around here]
The e¤ects are of considerable economic signicance at the global level. Based
on world GDP of $87.25tn in 2013 (CIA World Factbook 2015), a fully informative
good signal (" = 0:3) compared to no signal increases global welfare by the certainty
equivalent of $16.7bn per year for the next 300 years. Let us stress again that this
comes not from either changing future temperature levels, or by reducing our eco-
nomic exposure to climate change, but instead just by learning something beforehand
about the true level of the ECS which enables us to make better consumption and
savings decisions.
5.2 Physical adaptation measures against the severe state
In the theoretical section above and the rst set of numerical examples, savings were
the sole mechanism by which agents are able to smooth consumption between the
rst and second periods. This subsection introduces a second option for moving
resources to the second period. The agent can now choose, in addition to savings,
to allocate money over the rst t1 years into a real investment project that partially
protects against the severe outcome, but that o¤ers no benet should the state turn
out to be moderate. Such a measure might be, for example, the Dutch enhancing
their sea defences to protect against the possibility of very high sea level rises, or
in any nation, placing factories in less convenient but more secure locations. Such
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projects would not alter the evolution of Tt, but they would reduce the economic
impact of severe climate change.
Denote by y  0 the annual investment in the mitigation project over the rst t1
years. Then the average annual endowment over the second period is unchanged if
the state is moderate, but equals l if the state is severe, where l = h (h  l) 0:520y.
Now l = l as required if y = 0 and l = h if y =1. Innite investment obviously
impossible since period 1 has only a nite endowment  in this physical adaptation
measure will bring the economic impact of severe temperature changes down to the
moderate level. If we invest 1% / 5% / 10% / 20% of current income in the project
for the next t1 years, then we reduce the economic di¤erential between the severe
and moderate outcomes compared to the case when there is no physical adaptation
by 13% / 50% / 75% / 94% respectively. The residual b = e1   c1   y is saved in
the bank at a zero interest rate.6
We again use a numerical solver to choose c1 and y so as to maximise welfare at
t = 1 dependent on the signal that we receive. We restrict the agent from borrowing
resources against the future. In Figure 6 we report E1  [y] and E1  [b]; the amount
we expect to invest in physical adaptation and save in the bank respectively.
[Insert Figure 6 around here]
Interestingly, both these variables are non-montonic as the signal strengthens.
With " = 0 it is optimal to invest approximately 5% of time 1 endowment in the
physical adaptation measure, with nothing saved in the bank. As the strength of
the signal increases, physical adaptation declines or increases depending on whether
the signal is good or bad. Initially the decline with a good signal outweighs the
increase with a bad signal, so the expected level of adaptation investment decreases.
However, once the signal reaches a certain strength (approximately " = 0:17) the
level of physical adaptation following a good signal falls to zero. Beyond this point,
E1  [y] increases along with the signal strength, driven entirely by higher levels of
protective investment following a bad signal.
With no signal, there is no savings; monies are more protably deployed investing
in the physical adaptation measure. The same priorities apply when the signal is
bad. However, when the signal is good and once investment in mitigation approaches
zero, then savings yield value. For certain moderate signals money is both saved
in the bank and invested in the physical adaptation measure, but then the risk-free
savings absorb everything invested on behalf of period 2. This savings level then
6In sensitivity analysis below, we consider the case when t1 = 100 years. We then change the
expression for l so that we need to invest 2% of income per year over this horizon to halve the
impact of severe climate change compared to the moderate outcome.
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drops as the signal gets stronger still, as there is less need to smooth consumption
between the two time periods. In all cases, investment in the physical adaptation
measure is expected to be higher than the level of bank savings as it is, in general,
a much more e¤ective way of promoting welfare.
Figure 7 is analogous to Figure 5, addressing the case when physical adaptation
is a possible investment.
[Insert Figure 7 around here]
Consumption now takes a more complex, non-linear, form compared to when
there is no opportunity to invest in physical adaptation. E1  (c1) initially increases
as the signal strengthens, but then declines once " is greater than approximately 0.08.
This result is again driven by behaviour following a bad signal, when the desire to
move endowment away from consumption and into the self insurance mechanism gets
very strong for greater ".
As intuition would suggest, expected welfare remains monotonic increasing in the
strength of the signal. The e¤ect is an order of magnitude greater in the presence
of a physical adaptation measure compared to when there is no project that partly
protects against the economic consequences of severe temperature change. Now
the expected annual gain at the global level in consumption equivalent terms when
going from no signal to a full good signal is approximately $500bn: The value of
early information increases substantially if we can directly protect ourselves against
severe outcomes.
5.3 Heterogeneous outcomes
We now incorporate the possibility that not everyone will be equally a¤ected by a
severe outcome. If the state of the world is moderate, then the total endowment over
the period t 2 [t1 + 1; 300] is E2=t2 = h with certainty. However, if climate change
is severe then, with 5% probability, E2=t2 = 0:7l. This reects the fact that some
members of the population are likely to be much more severely a¤ected by extreme
climate change than others and we are currently unable to determine whether or
not we are in the high-risk group. Alternatively, we might posit that individuals
are saving or self insuring for the next generation, and care about all its members
equally. For the 95% of the population who are not a¤ected, E2=t2 = 1.0158l. This
keeps the economy-wide average income level in the severe state the same as in the
homogeneous agent example. l takes the same form as before for both the 95% and
5% groups. Thus, a 5% endowment spend over the next t1 = 50 years will halve the
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di¤erence in income between the moderate and severe states when compared to the
no insurance case.
Both in the presence and absence of a protective project, the broad shapes of
expected consumption, welfare and savings follow the patterns described in Figures
5-7. When physical adaptation is not possible, t = 1 expected consumption increases
as the signal gets stronger and expected welfare increases in signal strength. Further,
the relative benet of the full good signal when compared to no signal also now rises.
The annual certainty equivalent consumption level globally rises from $16.7bn for
the homogeneous agent model to $23.4bn when there are unequal outcomes.
In the presence of a physical adaptation measure, expected consumption at t = 1
decreases slightly compared to the homogeneous agent model. The reduced con-
sumption is primarily transferred into the protective project. We invest more in
physical adaptation with stronger good signals than in the homogeneous agent case,
resulting in the turning points in expected insurance investment and expected con-
sumption being slightly further to the right than in Figures 6 and 7.
With the potential to self insure, the annual certainty equivalent benet from a
full good signal rises from $499bn when all individuals are equally a¤ected by climate
change to $528bn in a heterogeneous agent environment. This is clearly a major
societal gain, and it comes even though there is no reduction in future climate change
itself.
Table 1 summarises the gains in welfare, cCE (") =cCE (" = 0) 1; for sixteen mod-
els when receiving the full good signal versus no signal. These are unit combinations
of four di¤erent frameworks: (i) t1 = 50 years and t1 = 100 years; (ii) l calibrated as
described above and l = 0:8, or average income is 80% per year of current endowment
in the second period if the state is severe; (iii) homogenous and heterogeneous agent
models, and; (iv) bank savings only and bank savings plus the potential to employ
the physical adaptation measure.
[Insert Table 1 around here]
In all cases, the signal improves welfare, as expected. In general, welfare is
improved more when physical adaptation measures are available, income levels are
low in the severe state, and agents have heterogeneous incomes and do not know
whether they will be rich or poor.
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6 Conclusion
Climate scientists have good reason to feel discouraged. Policy makers may pay
strong lip service to their warnings, but they take modest actions in response. Ad-
vances in the science have also disappointed: ndings have gained little precision in
decades, and while experts agree on certain aspects of the climate science, such as
predictions of global averages, wide variation and occasionally strong disagreement
remains about other aspects of the climate change problem. Localised climate pre-
dictions, the relationship between emissions and climate, the pathway of emissions,
the damages that emissions cause; all of these are subject to huge uncertainty and
disagreement. While some of these uncertainties are likely to be irreducible, fortu-
nately, in key areas, some are likely to be signicantly reduced. As long as scientic
research continues, some of Natures secrets will inevitably be revealed, uncertain-
ties at least partially resolved, along with the potential for disagreement. Yet, what
would be the value of such an advance in the science if policy makers do not respond?
This article addresses this question and provides a di¤erent and supplementary
justication for a vigorous climate science research e¤ort: better predictions on the
consequences of climate change will lead to better decisions on adaptation.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. If future climate change will be
severe, GDP will be signicantly impaired and major capital losses will be incurred.
If climate change is only moderate, the losses will be much less. The welfare that
we can expect when confronted by such uncertainty depends on the information
we have about the likelihood of severe and moderate climate change, and how we
use this information in making our adaptation decisions. Our welfare will therefore
also depend on how exible our adaptation strategies are. Those we consider are
saving for an impaired tomorrow and physical adaptation measures, such as building
seawalls or locating facilities in less desirable but less vulnerable locations.
Better predictions on the probabilities of severe and moderate consequences will
raise expected welfare by improving adaptation decisions. Even when we are in
a constrained world in which the only adaptation decision concerns saving for an
uncertain future, better predictions raise expected welfare by allowing more e¤ective
consumption smoothing. When physical adaptation measures are also available, the
prospect of improved signals is valued even higher. In essence, a better signal allows
us to nd the correct balance between damage limitation investments, consumption
smoothing and saving, and tailor the adaptation to the e¤ects of climate change in
di¤erent future states of the world.
Given the renewed prominence of adaptation in the high-level negotiations on
climate change, this is at the very least a morale boosting result for climate scientists.
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There is good reason to provide more rened scientic information about climate
change at the level of those who inevitably must adapt.
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7 Appendix
In this appendix we prove Results 1 and 2.
7.1 Result 1
If we receive the full signal at t = 1, then future endowment is fully known. In
this case, given that the utility function is concave, it is optimal to perfectly smooth
consumption across time: ct = (e1 + e2) =2 for t = 1; 2. Therefore the expected
welfare at time t = 1   is:
E1  [	] = E1 

2U

e1 + e2
2

:
With no signal, E1  [	] = 	; since there is no new information. Expectations are
the same whether taken at time t = 1   or t = 1. Therefore:
E1  [	] = max
c1
U(c1) + E1 U(e2 + e1   c1):
Undertaking the optimisation gives:
U 0(c1) = E1 U
0(e2 + e1   c1);
where c1 denotes the optimal consumption level. By Jensens inequality
E1 U 0(e2 + e1   c1)  U 0(E1  [e2 + e1]  c1) U 000 ()  0;
where the inequality is strict if and only if U 000 () = 0. Then
U 0(c1)  U 0(E1  [e2 + e1]  c1) U 000 ()  0: (1)
Now notice that if
c1 = E1 

e2 + e1
2

; (2)
then the left- and right-hand sides of equation (1) are equal. This is the expected
level of time 1 consumption under a full signal. When equation (1) is an inequality,
c1 must be less than the right hand side of equation (2) because U
00 () < 0. This
proves Result 1.2.
To establish Result 1.1, note that c1 cannot be equal to both (e1 + l) =2 and
(e1 + h) =2, the optimal consumption levels at time t = 1 following the receipt of a
bad and good signal respectively. Since consumption decisions under no signal do not
optimise expected welfare in the presence of a signal, the result follows immediately.
This is also a special case of Result A2.4 below.
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7.2 Result 2
We prove four sub-results. From them Result 2 in the body of the text follows
immediately
Result A2. If we receive a partial signal in the interval [1  ; 1], then:
A2.1 Let 21 denote the volatility of time 2 endowment, e2, as calculated at time 1.
Let 21 = 
2
G if the signal received is good and 
2
1 = 
2
B if the signal received is
bad. Then 2G < 
2 if "G > 1   2p and 2B < 2 if "B > 2p   1, where 2 is
the volatility of time 2 endowment calculated at time 1  . In addition, the
expectation of 21 as calculated at time 1  , 2G + (1  )2B, is monotonic
decreasing in the strength of the signal, "G.
A2.2 If prudence is zero, then the expectation at time t = 1  of time 1 consumption,
E1  [c1] ; is una¤ected by the anticipation of any signal.
A2.3 If prudence is positive, then the stronger the signal that we will receive (the
greater is "G), the higher is our expectation of time 1 consumption, E1  [c1].
A2.4 For all monotonic increasing and concave utility functions, the stronger the
signal that we will receive, the larger is the expected welfare as calculated at
time t = 1  ; E1  [	]
Proof. Use the notation  = ph+(1  p) l and 2 = p (h  )2+(1  p) (l   )2
to denote the mean and variance of time 2 endowment conditional on the information
available at t = 1   . It is straightforward to verify that 2 = p (1  p) (h  l)2.
Similarly, let G = (p+ "G)h + (1  p  "G) l, B = (p  "B)h + (1  p+ "B) l;
2G = (p+ "G) (h  G)2 + (1  p  "G) (l   G)2, and 2B = (p  "B) (h  B)2 +
(1  p+ "B) (l   B)2 denote the means and variances of time 2 endowment condi-
tional on receiving the good (G) and bad (B) signal in the interval [1  ; 1]. It is
again straightforward to verify that, for G = "G (h  l) and B = "B (h  l):
G = + G
B =   B
2G = 
2 + "G (1  2p  "G) (h  l)2
2B = 
2   "B (1  2p+ "B) (h  l)2 :
2G < 
2 if and only if 1   2p   "G < 0. For 2B < 2, 1   2p + "B > 0. It is also
straightforward to verify that:
2G + (1  )2B = 2  

1  "
2
G (h  l)2 ;
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which decreases as "G increases. This proves Result A2.1.
Now consider the welfare function at time 1 conditional on receiving the good
signal, 	G. Again, EG [] denotes the expectation taken at time t = 1 conditional
on the good signal.
	G = max
c1
U (c1) + EG [U (e1 + e2   c1)] :
Dene the variable  as follows. Let e2 = G + = + G + for  = h  G  or
 = l  G   depending on which state of the world occurs at t = 2. Undertaking
the optimisation and using c1G to denote optimal consumption at time 1 conditional
on receiving the good signal:
U 0 (c1G) = EG [U
0 (e1 + + G +    c1G)] : (3)
First consider the case when U 000 () = 0. Then, by Jensens inequality:
U 0 (c1G) = U
0 (e1 + + G   c1G) ;
showing immediately that c1G = (e1 + + G)=2. By an analogous argument, if we
receive the bad signal, c1B = (e1 +   B) =2. This results in
E1  [c1] = c1G + (1  ) c1B
=
e1 + 
2
+
G   (1  ) B
2
=
e1 + 
2
+
"G   (1  ) "B
2
(h  l) ;
and, through the relation between "G and "B; this is equal to (e1 + )=2 for any
potential signal that we might receive. This proves Result A2.2.
With U 000 () > 0, we can view U 0 () as a pseudo-utility function that is monotonic
decreasing and convex. Again, suppose that we have received the good signal at
t = 1. Note that V ar () = 2G and, as usual, c2G = e1+e2 c1G = e1++G+ c1G.
Using a standard Pratt-Arrow approach, we can replace this stochastic consumption
with the expected consumption level e1 ++ G  c1G minus a prudence adjustment
 G:
EG [U
0 (e1 + + G +    c1G)] = U 0 (e1 + + G   c1G    G)
 G   
1
2
2G
U 000 (e1 + + G   c1G)
U 00 (e1 + + G   c1G)
=
1
2
2GPG;
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where PG =  U 000 (e1 + + G   c1G) = U 00 (e1 + + G   c1G) is the prudence of
consumption at time 2 in the good state if endowment equals the expected value at
this time conditional on the signal received at t = 1.
Given this, from equation 3:
c1G =
e1 + + G    G
2
:
Similarly,
c1B =
e1 +   B    B
2
 B =
1
2
2BPB:
Therefore, under the assumption that prudence is approximately constant at value
P over the range of interest:
E1  [c1] = c1G + (1  ) c1B
=
e1 + 
2
+
"G   (1  ) "B
2
(h  l)  
2
G + (1  )2B
4
P
=
e1 + 
2
 

2   
1  "
2
G (h  l)2

P
4
:
The nal term gets less negative the stronger is the signal "G. A more powerful
signal increases expected time 1 consumption provided the agent is prudent. This
proves Result A2.3.
Result A2.4 follows immediately from, for example, [55] and [56]. A less clear
signal can be treated as a garbled interpretation of a stronger signal. As an
example, consider a world where unconditionally the moderate and severe outcomes
at t = 2 are equally likely. Assume that, if we receive the stronger good (bad)
signal at t = 1, then the probability of having the moderate outcome is revised to
70% (30%). A good (bad) weaker signal instead revises these probabilities to 60%
(40%).
The weak signal can be imaged as a world where we receive the strong signal, but
where it may be misread or garbled. In the example, imagine that there is a 25%
chance that we will mis-read a true good (bad) strong signal as being bad (good)
instead. Then on receiving a truly good strong signal, there is a 75% probability that
this will be interpreted correctly as a good strong signal and a 25% that it will be
mistakenly read as a bad strong signal. The estimated probability of the moderate
state occurring at time 2 is 75%*70% +25%*30% = 60% conditional on receiving
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this garbled signal. Similarly, on receipt of a bad signal, the estimated probability
of the moderate state occurring at time 2 is 75%*30% +25%*70% = 40%. The
probabilities are identical to those we assign under the weaker signal in the absence
of garbling. As the probabilities of the stronger signal bracket the probabilities
of the weaker signal, it is generally true that weaker signals can be interpreted as
garbled stronger signals.
Under these conditions, as argued by [56] (p. 1397), the stronger signal must
lead to higher utility so long as there is any change in best conditional action under
either message. As shown above, optimal consumption levels at t = 1 depend on
the value of "G, so conditional action does depend on the strength of the message.
This completes the proof of Result A2.4
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8 Figures & Tables
Savings only Savings and physical adaptation
l calibrated l = 0:8 l calibrated l = 0:8
t1 = 50 and t2 = 250
Homogeneous 1.92 9.08 57.21 97.66
Heterogeneous 2.68 10.75 60.60 98.50
t1 = 100 and t2 = 200
Homogeneous 3.17 13.52 49.62 80.18
Heterogeneous 4.35 15.90 52.12 80.73
Table 1. Certainty Equivalent Gains in Annual Consumption from a Full
Signal (measured in basis points). For the sixteen calibrations considered, this table
presents the basis point increase in the certainty equivalent annual consumption level
that arises as a consequence of having a full signal rather than no signal at the start
of t = 1; cCE (") =cCE (" = 0)  1. l is the average annual income in the severe state,
and is either calibrated as described in the body of the text or is set equal to 80% of
current endowment.
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Figure 1. Estimates of Climate Sensitivity Probability Densities. [24]
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t = 1-δ
Expected welfare 
evaluated
t = 1
Income received
Consumption choice made
Savings choice made
Signal received
t = 2
State revealed
Income received
All remaining wealth consumed
Figure 2. Timeline for Valuation, Decision and Realisation of Uncertainty.
Moderate Severe
P r
o b
a b
i l i
t y
Good signal
p+ε(G)
No signal
p
Bad signal
p‐ε(B)
Good signal
1‐p‐ε(G)
No signal
1‐p
Bad signal
1‐p+ε(B)
Figure 3. Illustration of Goodsignals and Badsignals. Following the
arrival of a good or bad signal prior to t = 1, this illustrates the probability of the
moderate and severe states occurring at t = 2.
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Figure 4. The Evolution of Temperature Change and Annual Income
Under the Moderate and Severe Scenarios.
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Figure 5. Gains in Consumption and Expected Utility as Signal Strength
Increases. This shows the expectation, as calculated at t = 1   , of t = 1
consumption and expected future welfare expressed as a basis point (1/100th%)
increase in the certainty equivalent consumption level (compared to the no signal
case) as the strength of a partial signal changes. Endowment over the rst t1 years
must be either consumed or saved in a risk-free asset with a zero interest rate.
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Figure 6. Investment in Physical Adaptation and Savings as Signal
Strength Increases. This shows the expectation, as calculated at t = 1   ,
of the levels of investment in the self insurance policy and the risk-free savings op-
portunity. Endowment at t = 1 can be either consumed, saved in a risk-free asset
with a zero interest rate, or invested in a physical adaptation project that partially
protects against the severe outcome.
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Figure 7. Gains in Consumption and Expected Utility with Physical
Adaptation as Signal Strength Increases. Following Figure 5, this shows the
expectation, as calculated at t = 1   , of t = 1 consumption and expected future
welfare expressed as a basis point (1/100th%) increase in the certainty equivalent
consumption level (compared to the no signal case) as the strength of a partial
signal changes. Endowment at t = 1 can be either consumed, saved in a risk-free
asset with a zero interest rate, or invested in a physical adaptation measure that
partially protects against the severe outcome.
40
